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Missionary Dilemmas 
in Times of Persecution: 
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ØYVIND M. EIDE 1
In 1981, during the communist regime, I worked as visiting pro-
fessor at the Mekane Yesus Theological Seminary (MYTS) in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.2 At the same time I served as liaison bet-
ween The Norwegian Missionary Society (NMS) and The Ethio-
pian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY). On the basis
of my office I was asked, via Rev. Tasgara Hirpo, by the EECMY
president, Emmanuel Abraham, if I was willing to collect infor-
mation on the harsh experiences of the EECMY at the time and
forward it to The Lutheran World Federation (LWF).3 It was
clear that the president himself was not in a position to speak
openly. 
The president had been a minister in Haile Selassie I’s
government. Only by forceful intervention by LWF, documen-
ting his faithful service for the Ethiopian people, did he avoid
execution at the hands of the revolutionary government in
1974.4 Later on, working as president of the EECMY, his positi-
on was vulnerable. In the political climate of the time, with a
Marxist-Leninist inspired dictatorship in power, the question of
information was most sensitive. The request was therefore of
great consequence and a risk to my wellbeing and the work of
my mission.
At the time the General secretary of the EECMY, Gudina
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Tumsa had been abducted. His whereabouts were unknown.5
The freedom of faith, conscience and assembly was at stake.
Preaching was restricted, church buildings were being closed in
the hundreds, colleagues were imprisoned, and congregation
members were indoctrinated for hours in Marxist-Leninist phi-
losophy. A severe crisis in the relationship between church and
state was developing.
My contract with the mission stated explicitly that I abstain
from any kind of political activity while serving as a guest in a
church and a country. The first question then was whether the
government’s harassment of the church was of a political kind?
And would not information be seen as an unfriendly act? The
request presented a huge dilemma. This paper is an exposition
of how it was solved. At the same time it sheds light on dilem-
mas of missions and churches, locally and internationally,
during times of persecution. 
Two Brands of Dictatorship
I was sent to Ethiopia during Haile Selassie’s regime. Neither
was I nor my mission aware that the sheer permission to work
in Ethiopia was part and parcel of the Emperor’s political ambi-
tion to modernize the Empire.6 The Imperial Decree on Mission,
from 1944, had come about after a prolonged struggle betwe-
en the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC) and
the Emperor. The Patriarch maintained that it was a grave poli-
tical mistake to split the ideological base of Ethiopia in the form
of two kinds of churches. In Ethiopia ecclesiology thus has a
political dimension.7
The Emperor’s feudal regime was autocratic with a poor
record on human rights. In fact it was the last country in the
world to abolish slavery (1933).8 When my mission responded
to a call from the EECMY, a debate rose in Norway whether it
was politically neutral to work in Ethiopia. The mission respon-
ded with a statement that it was our main task to save souls.9
The political constellation in any given time could not be of
consequence. Here the mission retorted to an age-old Lutheran
pietistic tradition to keep the regiments apart.10 This statement
was soon put to the test.
In 1974 the Ethiopian revolution erupted. The state disinte-
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grated into chaos and internal strife. In February 1977 Mengis-
tu Haile Mariam orchestrated a coup d’état. One of his first
moves was to confiscate Radio Voice of the Gospel 12 March
1977. In the aftermath of Mengistus takeover hundreds of youth
were killed during the so-called red terror.11 Because of the
gross violations of human rights, USA withdrew its support.
Mengistu therefore turned to the Soviet Union for assistance.
The prize was a communist dictatorship, guerrilla warfare and
a battleground of the Cold War.12
The withdrawal of the missionaries
The question now was if the change in dictatorial framework
had any consequence for the missionary enterprise? The rapid
developments, the dramatic turn of events and the propaganda
were a heavy strain on all the supporting missions.13 The ques-
tion of missionaries’ security therefore became critical during
the spring of 1977. The question whether or not they should
withdraw caused deep conflicts of conscience for the missio-
naries. Gradually the missions brought the issue to their boards
and decisions were made to withdraw personnel from the
exposed areas. 
In May 1977 the missionaries from The Sudan Interior Mis-
sion (SIM), working with the Kale Hiwot Church, were evacua-
ted from their stations and the numbers reduced from 200 to
40 in Ethiopia.14 By February 1978 The Norwegian Lutheran
Mission (NLM) had reduced its staff in Ethiopia from 158 to
58.15 The Norwegian embassy had advised the NLM four times
to evacuate its missionaries. The mission had complied only
partially with this advice, although by this time all the stations
in the south-east had been evacuated. The Danish Lutheran
Mission, working with the NLM in Bale, evacuated all their staff.
The NMS, working in remote areas in Western Ethiopia, eva-
cuated 16, all but one of their staff. They had been exposed to
severe hardships and an attack by a guerrilla movement. The
Norwegian Lutheran Free Church working in Ghion also eva-
cuated their staff. The same did the Finnish Missionary Society.
The Swedish Evangelical Mission and the German Hermanns-
burg Mission withdrew their staffs partly to Addis Ababa and
partly back home.16 Altogether 77 per cent of Lutheran missio-
nary personnel were withdrawn from Ethiopia.17
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A point of particular interest is the different strategies cho-
sen by the Norwegian missions. In order to understand the
decision of the NMS, one has to see it against the very painful
experiences connected to the evacuation of China in 1949.18
Part of the problem in China was disagreements among the
missionaries on policy towards the Communist. In order not to
risk a repetition of the China experience, the board of the NMS
followed the advice of the Norwegian Embassy and made a for-
mal decision to evacuate from Ethiopia.19
When security improved I was, together with a few collea-
gues, called back to service in 1980. The request from the
EECMY president brought the issue of missions and politics to
the test.
Political Dimensions of Human Rights
Human rights may be organized in groups: I will comment on
three of them in the following order: 1) The right to life and
survival, 2) Economic, social and cultural rights, 3) Individual
human rights.20
The right to life and survival
In my training as a theologian, human rights were not high on
the agenda. The life and work of Jesus shaped the pattern of a
missionary’s work. The struggle for human dignity and against
evil was thus given a Christological motivation. In traditional
form I served as a preacher, leader of literacy schools, a clinic
and an agricultural project. These activities were supportive of
life and survival and seemed politically neutral.
Detailed studies of the people’s motivations for changing
affiliation to Evangelical Christianity reveal that the church’s
service within health and education was crucial. A people who
only knew brutal exploitation, were surprised when experien-
cing love and kindness. Land-owner and slave were met and
treated with the same respect. The missionaries thereby con-
veyed a new vision of man and a radical change of values. This
body language thus represented a fundamental critique of the
prevalent values and political structures of society.21
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Economic, social and cultural rights
The Oromo, among whom I worked, had been subjugated to
Imperial rule at the end of the nineteenth century. The Amha-
ra, by virtue of their traditional position in society, their lang-
uage and Orthodox Christianity defined Ethiopia to the detri-
ment of other ethnic groups. Against this background the Ame-
rican anthropologist Donald Donham gives a powerful inter-
pretation of the Evangelical movement: “It re-established the
people’s identity”.22 The African theologian Lamin Sanneh
details this interpretation when he writes that the missions, in
particular through Bible translations and efforts within educa-
tion, gave the people “cultural self-understanding, pride of their
own language, social awakening, religious renewal… ”.23
The first phase of the revolution brought some of this, in
particular cultural rights, to the open in the so-called “First
Charter” (20 December 1974). It envisioned Ethiopia as a coun-
try without “ethnic, religious, linguistic or cultural differen-
ces.”24 Without being aware the church’s empowerment of opp-
ressed groups turned out to have an ethnic dimension. This
played directly into the ethno-political tensions of the state.
When a liberation movement sprang up in the EECMY areas,
partly led by former students of EECMY schools, the church
was caught in the middle.
Individual human rights
As a missionary I only gradually became aware of how the
Evangelical faith was reinterpreted in the minds of the listeners.
The reception illustrates how a seemingly non-political messa-
ge was translated into political reality. Gudina Tumsa gives a
vivid example of what this means:
In Gemo Gofa we see for example a group of Christians
bringing a landowner to court because he had confiscated
their land. They fought their case up to the High Court of
Ethiopia and won. For them justice was part of their under-
standing of salvation.25
This interpretation of salvation was a central issue in the
famous EECMY letter to LWF in 1972. Here the young church
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criticises the missions for not speaking up against colonial
exploitation. The letter then points at structural aspects of injus-
tice. By including the structures that hold humans in bondage
and degradation, the Church expands its understanding of sin.
The letter became a marker of EECMY theology which later on
was characterized as holistic.26
The letter is in part a reflection of the ecumenical debate of
the day, such as at the WCC in Uppsala 1968 and in particular
the LWF General Assembly in Evian 1970, where human rights
were on the agenda. These conferences made the EECMY turn
towards issues of social justice and human rights. The issues
were followed as a central concern of the WCC in Nairobi in
1975 and the LWF assembly in Dar-es-Salam in 1977.
When the revolution developed, the traditional response of
the church could have been quiet withdrawal from the political
arena. In stead we see a church that engages itself in the poli-
tical debate of the day. The LWF was an active adviser in the
process.27 In a Pastoral letter from 1975 the church gives sup-
port to the revolution on the condition that the state would be
based on law and human rights.28
As the revolution unfolded, freedom of faith turned out to be
the critical element. In an attempt to stem the influence of
atheist Marxism, Gudina Tumsa organized a Council for Coo-
peration of Churches in Ethiopia (CCCE). At this point Gudina
Tumsa was invited to cooperate with the government. He decli-
ned because of the ongoing harassment of Evangelical Christi-
ans. As a result he was labelled an enemy of the state. The
CCCE was seen as an attempt to organize an ideological oppo-
sition. Gudina Tumsa was eliminated and the state set out on a
course to destroy the Evangelical churches.29
Without being aware, missionary and church activity inter-
preted from a perspective of human rights, had played straight
into the socio-political, ethno-political, and the ideology-politi-
cal realm.
To Speak Or Not To Speak
The first to speak up was the Swedish Ecumenical Council in a
letter to the Ethiopian government.30 This was followed by a
paper from a group under the British Council of Churches at
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the beginning of 1979.31 The Ethiopian government gave an
indignant reply calling the accusations “calculated malicious
lies”, adding: “If there are impossible things, tampering with
religion in Ethiopia is one of those impossible things”. The
government at all times denied any persecution of Evangelical
Christians. This left the missions with a number of dilemmas.
Let me indicate four of them:32
Option 1: The traditional position
The government’s reaction and the abduction of Gudina Tumsa
a short time after left no one in doubt of the government’s will
to silence any opposition. The prevailing attitude among the
missionaries was to do what was possible and not provoke the
government by revealing its violations of human rights. One
should be grateful for the opportunities still available in a com-
munist land and avoid provocation that would lead to expulsi-
on and increased suffering for Ethiopian Christians. On the offi-
cial level this was the position of NLM. The NLM worked in
Southern Ethiopia where conditions were easier than in the
west. They were very cautious about aggravating the govern-
ment and putting the whole flourishing work in jeopardy. The
general secretary of the NLM, Egil Grandhagen, in an editorial
in their mission magazine, Utsyn, put heavy emphasis on the
missionary task “to win souls”. “Therefore one has to draw a
clear line between our call as Christian citizens and our call as
a missionary organization”.33 Against this policy it is quite
remarkable that the NLM board permitted their representative
in Ethiopia to join the information group.
Option 2: Try to force the state
The alternative option was to pressurize the government with
a threat to withdraw all humanitarian support and with it much
needed foreign currency. Both church and mission deemed it
ethically impossible to use sick and hungry people’s right to life
as a means in a power struggle with the government. 
Option 3: Shout it from the rooftops
A third option was to deem the violations of human rights as
so grave that one’s conscience forbade silence, whatever the
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consequences. The Berliner Mission (BM) opted for this appro-
ach. BM publicly denounced the Ethiopian government, in par-
ticular for its oppression of the ethnic group Oromo.34 Experi-
ences from the Confessional Church’s struggle during the Nazi
regime had taught them that silence was a dangerous path.
When the Hermannsburg Mission (HM) made a protest against
BM for linking the violations of human rights to the Oromo’s
situation, the BM reiterated by accusing the HM “for once again
keeping silent about concentration camps.” EECMY protested
against BM, maintaining that their action increased the pressu-
re on the church. BM was not willing to yield. This forced the
EECMY to break off relations with BM.35
Option 4: Publicize undeniable facts
This was the context of Emmanuel Abraham’s request to me in
1981. Emmanuel Abraham gave one condition: In order to
avoid any suspicion that information on the EECMY was linked
to the Oromo ethnic cause, he demanded that only facts wit-
hout interpretation be conveyed. Since the request came from
the president of the church it was seen as urgent to me as well
as my mission. How did I reply? I could not carry responsibili-
ty for such an undertaking alone. The first move was therefore
to invite the representative of the Swedish Evangelical Mission
(SEM), Rev. Ingvar Nilsson, the Hermannsburg Mission (HM),
Rev. Willy Kalmbach and the Norwegian Lutheran Mission, Rev.
Osvald Hindenes, for a meeting with the president’s liaison. We
decided that each of us pass the request on to our mission
boards. All of them solved the dilemma by allowing us to con-
vey information. 
The general secretary of the NMS, Odd Bondevik, tried to
establish criteria for relating to the Ethiopia situation. In the
mission’s magazine he wrote that “violations against basic
human rights, whether they are against Christians or others, is
our concern and we cannot pass by in silence.” Bondevik defi-
ned the criteria by reference to the Norwegian Church’s positi-
on during the Nazi regime. He quotes the Norwegian Church’s
stand in Kirkens grunn: 
It is a sin against God if the state starts to tyrannize the souls
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and claims the right to decide what a person shall believe,
think and feel as his conscience … Where the power of the
state separates from justice, there the state is no longer a
tool of God, but becomes a demonic power. Therefore there
are limits to obedience against the state.36
All missions were thankful for the accurate information given
by the group. By letting an international organization coordi-
nate the information process, a uniform policy was possible
and the missions and churches could speak with one voice. It
was left to LWF to decide whether to publicise information or
not.
The confiscation of the EECMY Central Office
The 10th of December 1981 the group got a tip, via a leak in
the government, that it was decided to confiscate the EECMY
Central Office as a first step to nationalize all church instituti-
ons. The decision only waited for Mengistu Haile Mariam’s sig-
nature. When order was given to evacuate the Central Office
two days later, information was sent to LWF. Through their con-
tacts with the World Council of Churches all member churches
were alarmed.37 The result was a storm of protest from all over
the world. No other institution of the EECMY was touched until
on 25 January 1982 when the Mekane Yesus Theological Semi-
nary was confiscated. The Seminary was, however, returned
later the same day. The most plausible reason was that the deci-
sion to confiscate was made at department level. Mengistu
could simply not risk a second international storm and so he
ordered the return of the seminary.38
It is obvious that the government was furious about the bad
press Ethiopia got in the West. Thinking the BM was behind the
information the secret police sent two agents to East Berlin.
There they were equipped with a bomb in order to blow up the
BM headquarters and kill its mission secretary, Gunnar Hassel-
blatt. However, the bomb went off while they were arming it.
One of the agents was killed and the other arrested by German
police.
At this point the LWF saw the situation as so serious that
Oberkirchenrat Christian Krause, on behalf of the LWF, esta-
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blished contact with the Ethiopian Embassy in Bonn to inform
them of the role of LWF. The ambassador rebuked him for inter-
vening in Ethiopia’s internal affairs. Krause reiterated with a
reference to human rights declarations and told the ambassa-
dors that the Christians in Ethiopia were our brothers and sis-
ters.
Epilogue
In January 1985 Emmanuel Abraham was replaced by Francis
Stephanos as president of the EECMY. At the time more than
3000 churches (Kale Hiwot: 1700, EECMY: 1000, Pentecostal,
Baptist and Mennonite: 300) were closed and church life was
brought to a standstill. Francis Stephanos was then invited to
participate in the drafting of a new state constitution. The
Church Officers saw that the church’s stand against the state
had almost led it to destruction. They therefore stepped down
and resolved that the president should accept the invitation. At
the same time there was a shift in leadership of the LWF, with
Gunnar Sålsett as the new general secretary. The LWF endorsed
the EECMY decision according to the pattern of relationship to
East European churches. The suffering of the Christians in Ethi-
opia was silenced! Two years later Francis Stephanos was elec-
ted as a member of the national congress. He took his seat
together with leaders of the EOC and the Muslim community.39
The EECMY had come full circle, from Emmanuel Abraham
participating in Haile Sellassie’s autocratic government, via the
EECMY letter of 1972 that criticized the missions for keeping
silent on human rights abuses, via critical engagement during
the revolution, to silent participation in a state with one of the
worst records on human rights in recent history. The EECMY
was domesticated and has never since dared speak up on
human rights issues in Ethiopia. 
Did international pressure have any effect on the Ethiopian
government’s handling of the church? It seems that it merely
aggravated the political authorities. The bomb in Berlin shows
how far the government was willing to go in order to silence
critics. However, in 1981 the proposed takeover of EECMY insti-
tutions never occurred and in 1982 the Mekane Yesus Theolo-
gical Seminary was handed back. If this came as a result of the
LWF channel, something substantial was achieved.
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Let me finish with a reflection by Meseret Sebhat Leab, a
scholar of the EOC. At the time I did my research on the per-
secution of the EECMY, I asked how the church could coope-
rate with a government that had killed the Patriarch and
appointed its own man against canonical law. He paused for a
while before he answered: “Canonical law is one thing. Survi-
val is another. What you are witnessing is a question of survi-
val.”  
Abstract
Under the Communist regime in Ethiopia 1974-1991, the Evan-
gelical churches were subject to severe persecution, with more
than 3000 church buildings closed and pastors imprisoned, tor-
tured and killed. In this situation a group of missionaries was
asked by the leadership of the Lutheran church to pass on
information to the Lutheran World Federation. This was a poli-
tically charged request and therefore a risky undertaking. At
the same time the harassment of the churches were serious bre-
aches of human rights. The article explores the dilemmas of
conscience of the missionaries and how the dilemmas were sol-
ved. At the same time the article sheds light on dilemmas of
missions and churches, locally and internationally in relation to
brutal dictatorships. It also shows how a church is forced from
a position of critical engagement in society to submission and
silence. 
NORSK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MISJONSVITENSKAP 3-4/2012 223
Nr 3-4-2012-ferdig_12  20.11.12  15.34  Side 223
224 NORSK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MISJONSVITENSKAP 3-4/2012
Noter
1 Øyvind M. Eide is professor emeritus at The School of Mission and Theo-
logy (Misjonshøgskolen), Stavanger, former visiting professor at Mekane
Yesus Theological Seminary, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Director of The
Norwegian Institute of Pastoral Care, Modum Bad. The article is based on
Eide, Ø.M. (2000), Revolution and Religion in Ethiopia 1974-85, James
Currey, Oxford.
2 This article is a development of a lecture given at a conference in Sigtu-
na, Sweden, on the Nordic-Baltic churches and the cold war, 28.02.2012.
3 At the time Rev. Tasgara Hirpo was president of The Western Synod of the
EECMY and at the same time my colleague at the MYTS.
4 In his autobiography: Emmanuel Abraham (1995) Reminiscences of my
Life, Oslo, pp. 229-242, he gives a detailed account of his time in detenti-
on. On 23 November 1974 the acting prime minister and 59 member of
Haile Sellassie I’s government and other top officials were summarily exe-
cuted, Eide, Ø.M. (2000) Revolution and Religion in Ethiopia 1974-85,
Oxford, p.98.
5 Gudina Tumsa was abducted on 28 July 1979 and executed the same
night. A detailed account of the imprisonment and abduction of Gudina
Tumsa is found in Eide (2000), pp. 175-179.
6 The very title of the autobiography of Haile Selassie I, My Life and Ethio-
pia’s progress, (1976) indicates the centrality of modernization by intro-
ducing into the country Western modes of education.
7 The political consideration that the religious unity was an important basis
for national unity constitute the religio-political background for the oppo-
sition and persecution of Evangelical Christianity by local authorities prior
to the revolution in 1974. Cfr. Eide (2000), pp. 25-39.
8 A detailed account of slavery in Ethiopia is found in Teshale Tibabu
(1995), The Making of Modern Ethiopia 1896-1974, Lawrenceville NJ,
pp53-70.
9 Gjeldsten, G. “Kritiske spørsmål”, Norsk Misjonstidende nr 13, 1969.
10 The main points of the debate are referred in Eide, Ø.M. (2006) ”Politikk,
misjon og menneskerettigheter i Etiopia”, in Thor Strandenæs (red.)
Misjon og kultur: Festskrift til Jan-Martin Berentsen, Stavanger.
11 The terror and cruelty of the time are unparalleled in Ethiopian history.
Estimates of the numbers killed vary. Andargachew Tiruneh (1993) The
Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: A Transformation from an Autocratic to
a Totalitarian Autocracy, Cambridge, p. 211, gives a careful number of
1500. Other sources give higher numbers.
12 For an overview of the larger political framework cfr.  Latham, M.E. “The
Cold War in The Third World 1963-1975”, in Leffler, M.P. and O.A. Westad
(2010), The Cambridge History of The Cold war, Volume II, Crisis and
Détante, Cambridge, pp. 258-280. The shift of political alliances in Ethio-
pia during the Cold War is analysed in detail by Keller, E.J. (1991) Revol-
utionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic, Bloomington, IN, p.
191ff.
13 Vinskei: Situasjonen I Etiopia i dag, 6. desember 1976.
Nr 3-4-2012-ferdig_12  20.11.12  15.34  Side 224
14 Peter Cotterell interview 3 May 1990, Kay Bascom interview 12 March
1995, cfr. Eide 2000:169.
15 Oswald Hindenes, ‘Årsmelding fra Etiopia’, NLM Årbok 1978:78.
16 The facts are compounded mainly from Report from a meeting between
representatives of the EECMY and cooperating partners at Johannelund,
Sweden, 25-26 August 1977. Cfr. Eide 2000:131.
17 The number of western missionaries working in the EECMY, was reduced
from approx. 390 to 90.
18 As The Red Army advanced in China, most of the missionaries of the NMS
were evacuated, but some remained. This created turmoil in the mission.
Cfr. Eggen, E. “Kina” in Jørgensen, T. (red.) (1992) I tro og tjeneste, Det Nor-
ske Misjonsselskap 1842-1992, Stavanger.  
19 Cf. Kjosavik, TD «Etiopia», in Jørgensen, T. (red.) (1992), I tro og tjeneste:
Det norske misjonsselskap 1842-1992, p.140-146, Eide op. Cit.141.
20 Tergel, A. (1998) Human Rights in Cultural and Religious Traditions,
Uppsala, gives a broad presentation of the churches’ handling of issues
related to human rights. In addition to the three groups mentioned here
he also discusses ecological rights.
21 Cfr. Eide (2000) pp. 29, 63, 82.
22 Donham, D. & W. James (1986) The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethio-
pia, Cambridge, p. 45.
23 Sanneh, L. (1997) Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Cul-
ture, New York, pp. 1-8.
24 Eide (2000) op.cit. 96.
25 Gudina Tumsa, (2003) Witness and Discipleship: The Essential Writings of
Gudina Tumsa, Addis Ababa, p. 131.
26 The full text of the letter is published in Eide (2000) op.cit.263-268.  For
an analysis of the letter cfr. Eide (2000) pp. 68-70
27 Four seminars on Christianity and socialism were conducted at MYTS in
1975-6.
28 The full text of The Pastoral Letter is published in Eide (2000) pp. 269-70.
29 Patriarch Tewoflos had been arrested and was killed 27 July 1979, the
night before Gudina Tumsa was killed. Hadji Mohammed Sani Habib, a
leading Muslim, was forced into submission when the government killed
his son and threatened to kill his second son. Cfr. Eide (2000) op.cit. pp.
113, 127-8, 164-5, 175-6.
30 Archbishop Sundby, Swedish Ecumenical Council to Ethiopian Govern-
ment, Uppsala/Stockholm 18 January 1979.
31 Blair, M. ”Christians in Ethiopia: A Background Paper on Recent Events”,
19 February 1979, (Unpublished). Lutheran World Information 22 March
1979.
32 Getahun Ijigu, Ambassador Extraordinary to Archbishop Sundby, 24 Janu-
ary 1979.
33 Egil Grandhagen, ‘Misjon og politikk’ Utsyn 8 Februery 1981.
34 The mission secretary of the BM, Gunnar Hasselblatt, published a number
of articles mainly in German newspapers 1982-6, cfr. Eide (2000) pp. 209-
10.
NORSK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MISJONSVITENSKAP 3-4/2012 225
Nr 3-4-2012-ferdig_12  20.11.12  15.34  Side 225
226 NORSK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MISJONSVITENSKAP 3-4/2012
35 The debate and the documents are presented in Eide (2000) pp. 211-12.
36 The public debate in Norway is presented in Eide (2000) pp. 213-4. Cfr.
Austad (1977), Kirkens grunn: Analyse av en kirkelig bekjennelse fra
okkupasjonstiden 1940-45, Oslo.
37 The gen.secr. of LWF, Carl H. Mau called upon all its member churches to
“demonstrate solidarity with the Mekane Yesus Church in any way they
deemed appropriate”, Eide (2000), p. 214.
38 Cf. Launhardt, J. (1982) Uns erschrecken die Trommeln nicht mehr: Stad-
trandgemeinde in Addis Abeba, Erlangen, p212.
39 For this paragraph cfr. Eide (2000) pp. 235-48.
Øyvind M. Eide, b 1944, Cand.theol, MF 1970. Misjonsprest,
NMS, Etiopia, 1973-76, 1980-82, 2003-04. Stipendiat, senere sty-
rer, Institutt for sjelesorg 1976-78 og 1991-94. Godkjent pasto-
ralklinisk veileder 1988, Amanuensis 1978-94, rektor for prak-
tisk teologisk seminar og professor Misjonshøgskolen 1994-
2009. Teol.dr. Uppsala 1996. Publikasjoner: (2000) Revolution
and religion in Etiopia 1974-85, James Currey, Oxford, (2002)
Skatten og leirkaret: sjelesørgeriske perspektiv på erfaringer I
en misjonærs liv, Misjonshøgskolens forlag, Stavanger, (2008)
Restoring life in Christ: Dialogues of care in Christian commu-
nities: An African perspective, Vol I, II, III, Makumira Publicati-
ons, Neuendettelsau.
Nr 3-4-2012-ferdig_12  20.11.12  15.34  Side 226
